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I. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, the internet has become part of our daily lives. As the Covid-
19 outbreak unfolds, our dependence on cyberspace has become even greater. Health 
systems are operated partially through information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), policymakers share vital and often confidential ideas through digital channels, and 
public information is disseminated by the media on their websites and mobile apps. The 
crisis has also forced us to move significant aspects of our personal and professional lives 
online. Parliaments around the world are holding sessions via video-link, medical 
appointments are now conducted online, and those who can work from home rely on their 
internet connections to hold online meetings, send and receive messages.  
 
Whilst cyberspace has become a fertile field for malicious operations that may compound 
an existing health crisis, it also offers countless opportunities to respond more effectively 
to such crises. States are bound by several rules of international law requiring them to 
behave diligently in order to prevent, halt or redress harmful cyber operations  what we 
 and other health crises. On the 
one hand, failure to implement protective measures of due diligence or reasonable care in 
cyberspace can have disastrous consequences in the fight against Covid-19 and other 
diseases  especially when harmful cyber operations target critical infrastructure, such as 
the healthcare sector. In particular, the inability or unwillingness to prevent or halt cyber 
operations against hospitals or research facilities can hamper efforts to test and treat 
patients or to develop a vaccine. On the other hand, cyber due diligence measures can 
enabling a more rapid recovery from health crises. For instance, with the necessary 
safeguards in place, contact tracing apps and the dissemination of accurate public health 
information on social media can help contain the spread of the disease.      
 
The international community already benefits from a suitable  if patchy  international 
legal and policy framework 
and remedying harmful cyber operations against systems and infrastructures which are 
essential during health crises. States must implement those obligations, inter alia, by 
adopting measures aiming at: establishing an adequate national legal framework; 
monitoring cyber threats; enhancing the security and resilience of relevant systems and 
infrastructure; engaging in constructive international cooperation and dialogue. By 
behaving diligently in cyberspace, States will more likely be able to contain the spread of 
Covid-19, prevent further harm and pursue an effective recovery from the outbreak. 
 
 
 
-draft -Ended Working Group on 
cybersecurity (OEWG) reaffirmed the need to implement, at all times, strong protective 
measures for critical infrastructure against the malicious use of ICTs. Even though the 
include, at the very least, medical facilities and other healthcare services, electricity grids, 
water and sanitation systems,1 as well as financial and electoral services. Interference in 
the networks and systems of these vital activities could have disastrous consequences not 
development.2  
 
The risk and impact of malicious cyber operations against such infrastructure are 
heightened during a public health emergency. For cyber criminals and hacker groups, 
many of which are notorious State proxies, the public distress and vulnerability caused by 
the Covid-19 outbreak are an opportunity that can be exploited for personal or political 
gain.3 For instance, attempts have been made to steal the results of vaccine clinical trials 
4 
Likewise, hospitals and laboratories in the Czech Republic were targeted by ransomware 
attacks, forcing delays in scheduled operations.5 There have also been reports of Covid-
19-related phishing messages and fraudulent websites worldwide, whose content has 
ranged from fully-fledged disinformation campaigns to sales of inexistent medical 
equipment.6 The potentially destabilising impact of such operations has prompted strong 
reactions from several States. 
 
twork 
and information systems held by or on behalf of the NHS [National Health Service] in 
England or those bodies which provision public health services in England must be 
protected to ensure those systems continue to function to support the provision of services 
intended to address coronavirus and COVID- 7 For this purpose, executive directions 
were adopted to enable the National Cyber Security Centre to strengthen the ability of 
those networks and systems 
compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or 
1 -
the Open-Ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the 
https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/czech-
republic-oewg-pre-draft-suggestions.pdf.  
2 UN Open-Ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in 
-
https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/200527-oewg-ict-revised-pre-draft.pdf, § 22. 
3 
Forbes
, Naked Security (Sophos), 18 March 2020, 
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/03/18/ddos-attack-on-us-health-agency-part-of-coordinated-
campaign/amp/ D-
SophosNews, 14 April 2020 https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/14/covidmalware/. 
4 
The Guardian, 3 May 2020.  
5 - ZDNet, 
13 March 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/czech-hospital-hit-by-cyber-attack-while-in-the-midst-of-a-
covid-19-outbreak/.  
6 -
ZDNet, 13 March 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/state-sponsored-hackers-are-now-using-
coronavirus-lures-to-infect-their-targets/.  
7 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-of-nhs-and-public-health-services-digital-systems-
coronavirus-directions-2020, 1. 
transmitted or processed data or the related services offered by, or accessible via, those 
network and informa 8  
 
In the same vein, referring to recent cyber threats against health and research facilities in 
the UK, Europe and the US,9 
and the norms of responsible state behaviour must be respected and all states have an 
important role to play to help counter irresponsible activity being carried out by criminal 
10  
plicable to cyberspace to protect the healthcare 
sector came  among others  from Australia,11 the Czech Republic,12 Estonia,13 the 
Nordic countries14 and the US.15  More tellingly, the European Union, upon condemning 
against actors conducting such activities from its territory, consistent with international 
16   
 
It emerges from those declarations that many States believe in the existence of a legal and 
policy framework to increase cybersecurity and resilience, made up of binding rules and 
-binding norms of 
17 Central to such a two-pronged framework is the idea that, 
to the best of their abilities to prevent, halt and redress a range of harmful cyber operations 
emanating from their territory. This, together with the above statements, suggests that, in 
times of public health emergency, States ought to exercise due diligence in cyberspace. 
8 Ibid, Section 2. 
9 
 2020, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/warning-issued-uk-usa-healthcare-organisations.  
10 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-condemns-cyber-actors-
seeking-to-benefit-from-global-coronavirus-pandemic.  
11 - ZDNet, 
27 April 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/australia-and-us-call-out-cyber-attacks-on-hospitals-during-
covid-19-pandemic/. 
12 Czech Republic,  (n. 1). 
13 ERR News, 20 April 2020, 
https://news.err.ee/1080058/reinsalu-condemns-cyber-attacks-against-czech-critical-infrastructure.  
14 
Arria-
https://www.norway.no/en/missions/UN/statements/security-council/2020/arria-cyber-stability-and-conflict-
prevention.  
15 
https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-concerned-by-threat-
of-cyber-attack-against-the-czech-republics-healthcare-sector/.   
16 
European Union, on malicious cyber activities 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/04/30/declaration-by-the-high-
representative-josep-borrell-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-malicious-cyber-activities-exploiting-the-
coronavirus-pandemic/
Statement on the International Law Protections Against Cyber Operations Targeting the Health Care 
Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, May 2020, https://elac.web.ox.ac.uk/the-
oxford-statement-on-the-international-law-protections-against-cyber-operations-targeting-the-hea.  
17 e Field of Information and 
 
Without measures of prevention, control and crisis response, overburdened healthcare 
facilities around the world risk collapsing, and full recovery may be slow if not impossible.   
 
III. Cyber Due Diligence between International Law and Policy 
 
Due diligence has recently gained prominence in the cyber domain as a way to hold States 
indirectly accountable for hams caused by third parties. Responsibility arises from a failure 
to prevent or redress harms originating from or transiting through their jurisdiction, without 
the need to factually or legally attribute the conduct to the State in question.  Thus, several 
States and scholars have supported a customary rule or principle requiring States to 
exercise due diligence 18 
must exercise due diligence in not allowing 
cyber operations that affect the rights of, and produce serious adverse consequences for, 
19 However, some governments have been reluctant to accept this formulation 
as a binding rule of customary international law.20 Instead, a very similar articulation of 
cyber due diligence has been recognised by the UN Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) on cybersecurity as well as the UN General Assembly as a voluntary, non-binding 
States should not knowingly allow their 
21  
 
The confusion surrounding the concept of cyber due diligence seems to result from its 
treatment as a standalone obligation or principle.  It may well be that a cyber-specific due 
diligence rule is emerging,22 but this claim should not detract from the fact that international 
law in its entirety applies by default to cyberspace  or, more accurately, to ICTs  and 
States have unanimously and explicitly recognised as much.23 Thus, the pre-existing range 
of international obligations of due diligence requiring States to prevent, stop or redress 
certain harms are already applicable to harmful cyber operations. These include two rules 
of general application in international law, covering all fields of State activity, as well as 
rules found in specialised international legal regimes.  
The first comes from the 1949 Corfu Channel case between the UK and Albania. There, 
24 This 
18 Michael N. Schmitt, 'In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace,' (2015) 125 Yale LJ Forum 68. 
19 Michael N. Schmitt, (ed) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2017), Rule 6, 30 (emphasis added).  
20 Liisi Adamson, 'Recommendation 13(c),' in UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, Voluntary, Non-Binding 
Norms for Responsible State Behaviour in the Use of Information and Communications Technology: A 
Commentary (New York: United Nations, 2017), 55, § 12. 
21 UN GGE Report (n. 17), § 13(c) (emphasis added). 
22 Droit International appliqué aux opérations dans le 
cyberspace
International Cyber Engagement Strategy  Annex A: Australia's position on how international law applies 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-
relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/annexes.html#Annex-A; Organization of 
 International Law and State Cyber Operations: Fourth Report 
(Presented by Prof. 
- https://front.un-arm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/200414-rok-comment-on-pre-draft-of-oewg.pdf, 2. 
23 See, e.g., UN GGE Report (n. 17), §§ 26-28. 
24 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania), Merits, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949) 4, 22 
(emphasis added). 
arily being a violation of a particular rule of international law.25 
It imposes on States a standard of diligent behaviour, i.e. to employ their best efforts, to 
prevent or stop such acts.26 It is triggered by actual or constructive knowledge that the acts 
27  
 
The second rule of international law establishing a due diligence duty of general application 
- nciple has gained 
most prominence in the environmental context, its origins go far back to nineteenth century 
State-to-State disputes about the treatment of aliens abroad.28 The rule was most clearly 
articulated in the 1941 Trail Smelter award, where the arbitral tribunal held that a State 
owes at all times a duty to protect other states against injurious acts by individuals from 
within their jurisdiction 29 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities,30 which are deemed to 
reflect customary international law, at least in significant part.31 Article 3, in particular, 
sanctioned the customary nature of this duty in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion,32 while the ILC itself recognised its applicability beyond the environmental 
realm.33 Unlike the rule articulated in Corfu Channel, the no-harm principle requires States 
to prevent transboundary harm even if caused by activities that are lawful or not contrary 
to the rights of other States.34  As it explained, this is an obligation of due diligence, not 
25 The Tallinn Manual 2.0, going beyond the ICJ reasoning, argues that such acts are limited to  
internationally wrongful acts by a State, or acts committed by other entities that would have been 
internationally wrongful if committed by the State from where the harm originates or through which it 
transits. See Schmitt, Tallinn Manual (n. 19) 39, § 34; 34, § 14, 35 36, § 21. 
26 See e.g. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual  (n. 19) 30; Karine Bannelier-Christakis, 'Cyber Diligence: A Low-
Intensity Due Diligence Principle for Low-Intensity Cyber Operations?,' (2014) 14 Baltic Y Intl L 5; 
International Law Association (ILA), 'Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, Second Report,' 
July 2016, 2.  
27 Robert Kolb, 'Reflections on Due Diligence Duties and Cyberspace,' (2015) 58 GerY Intl L 123 24; 
Schmitt, Tallinn Manual (n. 19) 44 45, §§ 7-9; 47, §§ 16-18; Russell Buchan, 'Cyberspace, Non-State 
Actors and the Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Harm,' (2016) 21(3) J Confl & Sec L441 42.  
28 See, e.g., Alabama Claims Arbitration (USA v UK) (1872) 29 RIAA 125, 127, 129, 131-132; Wipperman 
Case (USA v Venezuela) (1887), reprinted in John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the International 
Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party, vol. 3 (1898 1906), 3041; Neer Case (USA v 
Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 60, 61-62. See also Trail Smelter Case (USA v Canada), (1941) 3 RIAA 1911, 
1963-1965. 
29 Trail Smelter Case, ibid, 1963. 
30 
-third session (23 April 1 June and 2 
July  UN Doc. A/56/10, 144-170. 
31 Timo Koivurova, 'Due Diligence,' Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, February 2010, § 
10. 
32 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ GL No 95, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 
para 29. 
33 ILC, Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm (n. 30), 148-149. See also Jutta Brunée and 
Tamar Meshel, 'Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: International Environmental Law Lessons for 
Cyberspace Governance,' (2015) 58 Ger Y Intl L 134 35; Koivurova (n. 31), §§ 16, 23, 44-45. 
34 Failure to exercise the requisite diligence leads to liability to redress the harm by compensation, once it 
materialises  with international responsibility arising if the State fails to effect such redress.ILC, Draft 
articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm (n. 30), 150.  
possible efforts to minimize the risk  thereof.35   
 
Duties of due diligence can also be found in specialised bodies of international law, which, 
as noted earlier, apply by default to ICTs in the absence of carve-outs. With respect to 
Covid-19, it is helpful to recall that international human rights law (IHRL) imposes on States 
positive obligations to safeguard the enjoyment individual human rights, including civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights, online and offline.36 These positive 
obligations entail a range of due diligence duties requiring States to adopt all reasonable 
measures to protect and ensure the human rights of individuals subject to their jurisdiction 
against threats posed by private or public entities or external circumstances, such as 
natural disasters or epidemics.37 Due diligence, in this context, describes the standard of 
conduct against which State compliance with those obligations is measured.38 Covid-19-
themed or related cyberattacks, such as those described in Section II above, have the 
potential to harm inter alia 
expression.39 Accordingly, States must do their best to prevent, stop and remedy such 
cyber operations  risdiction  
whether or not they are perpetrated by State agents, private individuals or simply result 
from an accident.40 
jurisdiction for IHRL purposes is particularly problematic in respect to cyberspace or 
ICTs,41 
 physical, logical and personal.42 Although this issue is beyond the scope of this 
contribution, it suffices to note that any model of extraterritorial jurisdiction over human 
rights online43 
harm or threat.  
35 Ibid, 154. 
36 See also UN Human Right
 
37  v. Romania, Appl. no. 61496/08,  5 September 2017, § 110, with respect to the right to 
privacy. 
38 HRC, General Comment No. 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, § 8; Samantha 
Besson, 'Due Diligence and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations  Mind the Gap!,' ESIL Reflections 9, 
no. 1, 28 April 2020, 4 5. 
39 Marko Milanovic and Michael N. Schmitt, 'Cyber Attacks and Cyber (Mis)Information Operations during a 
Pandemic,' J Natl Sec L & Pol, forthcoming, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612019. 
40 In the context of cyberspace, see Schmitt, Tallinn Manual (n. 19) Rule 36, 196 201; Milanovic and 
Schmitt, (n. 39), 22. See generally Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras (Merits), Ser. C. No. 4, 29 July 1988, 
§§ 172-173; , Appl. No. 48939/99, 30 November 2004, §§ 89-90, 97-110; Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia, Appl. No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010, §§ 218-223; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, Appl. 
nos. 14350/05, 15245/05 and 16051/05,  17 November 2017, §§ 173-174.  
41 Marko Milanovic, 'The Murder of Jamal Khashoggi: Immunities, Inviolability and the Human Right to Life,' 
(2020) 20(1) Hum Rts LR 21 24,. 
42 Clare Sullivan, 'The 2014 Sony Hack and the Role of International Law,' (2015-16) 8(3) J Natl Sec L & 
Pol 454, fn 88. 
43 Different human rights bodies and scholars have oscillated between different models of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction: a) spatial, requiring control over physical infrastructure (e.g. a server or satellite; see e.g. 
 (Admissibility), App no 52207/99, 12 December 2001, §§ 74-82); b) personal, 
requiring control of the individual victim/right-holder (see e.g HRC, General Comment 31 (n. 38), § 10); c) 
activity-based, whereby control must be exercised over the activity in question (e.g. the acts hacking a 
computer; see e.g. 
September 2019, § 22); or d) functional, requiring control over the enjoyment or exercise of the rights in 
question, broadly defined (e.g. HRC, General Comment 36, ibid, § 63; Yuval Shany, 'Taking Universality 
Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights Law,' (2013) 7(1) Law 
& Ethics of Hum Rts 47. 
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) also establishes a range of due diligence 
obligations.44 Cyberwarfare has become a common feature of modern armed conflicts. 
Malicious cyber operations have the potential to intentionally or indiscriminately render 
civilian infrastructure dysfunctional, disrupting the provision of services essential to the 
civilian population.45 Thus, during armed conflict and even in peacetime, States must 
behave diligently in adopting measures to protect civilians against the effects of violent 
cyberattacks.46 Likewise, they have a general duty to act with due diligence to ensure that 
parties to an armed conflict do not violate IHL, including in cyberspace.47  
 
Crucially, the applicability of this comprehensive, yet multifaceted and patchy framework 
in cyberspace has received support from several States, especially in times of Covid-19.  
For instance, France,48 Austria,49 Australia,50 and the Czech Republic51 have not only 
expressed concern for cyberattacks against health and research facilities but also explicitly 
recognised the binding nature of due diligence obligations under international law, IHRL 
and/or IHL.   
 
-binding norms of 
2015 GGE Report and reaffirmed in the context of the pandemic,52 also seem to embrace 
a preventive and precautionary approach in respect of harmful cyber operations. They 
send a message that resonates even more clearly during a public health crisis: States 
should take reasonable steps and appropriate measures to protect their critical 
infrastructure from ICT threats, especially those that can compound the crisis or hinder an 
effective response to the outbreak. Of particular importance in this context are the following 
measures that States are encouraged to take: enactment of domestic legislation,53 
monitoring,54 confidence-building,55 and international cooperation and capacity-building.56 
44 See e.g. Marco Longobardo, 'The Relevance of the Concept of Due Diligence for International 
Humanitarian Law,' (2020) 37(1) Wisc Intl LJ 44. 
45 rations during Armed Conflicts  ICRC position 
, 5. 
46 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), 8 June 1977, Art. 58; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005), Rules 22-
24. 
47 Geneva Conventions of 1949, common Art.1; AP I, Art. 1(1). 
48 Franc - https://front.un-
arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/contribution-fr-oewg-eng-vf.pdf.  
49 -Draft Report of the OEWG - https://front.un-
arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/comments-by-austria.pdf.  
50 - he report of the UN Open Ended Working 
16 April 2020, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/final-australia-comments-on-oewg-pre-
draft-report-16-april.pdf.  
51 Czech Republic, (n. 1).  
52 See, e.g., n. 48, 49, 50 above. 
53 See, e.g. "Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security", UN Doc. A/68/98, 24 June 2013, § 
32(a).  
54 e Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/collated-summaries-regional-gge-
consultations-12-3-2019.pdf, 17. 
55 UN GGE Report (n. 17), §§ 16-18. 
56 Ibid, §§ 19-23. 
But the responsibility to adopt those measures arises not only from voluntary commitments 
made in that report, the OEWG and other fora, or the resulting social expectation. These 
various measures may be required in different circumstances by the range of international 
obligations of due diligence outlined earlier  to the extent that such measures would be 
a way to prevent, halt and redress harmful cyber operations.  
 
IV. Cyber Due Diligence Measures and their Impact on the Pandemic 
 
The general thrust of due diligence obligations is to require States to do what they can do. 
Such duties do not impose pre-determined measures, but demand from States reasonable 
efforts to prevent, stop or redress harm, subject to their capacity to act in the circumstances 
and their knowledge or foreseeability of the harm or risk. Thus, their extent varies on the 
basis of available resources, the degree and type of harm or risk they seek to avert, as 
diligence obligations afford a degree of flexibility and deference to States, but they are 
accompanied by a core procedural obligation of result to put in place the  necessary 
governmental capacity to fulfil applicable obligations.57 This means that, beyond this 
minimal threshold, each State may be required to adopt different due diligence measures 
depending on the circumstances. As the ICJ recalled in the Bosnian Genocide case, due 
diligence calls for an in concreto or contextual assessment of State behaviour.58 Also, any 
cyber due diligence measures must be consistent with other international obligations that 
a State may have, especially their negative and positive obligations in respect of human 
rights affected by adopted measures. 
 
The following measures are particularly suitable, if not essential, to any attempt at 
preventing, halting and redressing online harms that may either compound ongoing health 
problems or jeopardise the effective recovery therefrom. 
 
a) National legal framework 
 
Any plan of action to implement cyber due diligence measures ought to begin with the 
establishment of an adequate national legal framework.59 An adequate national legal 
framework in this sense would include, first and foremost, the prohibition or criminalisation 
of harmful cyber conduct. Likewise, the availability of civil remedies alongside provision for 
effective investigations and prosecutions of malicious cyber behaviour are instrumental in 
deterring, preventing and redressing ensuing harms.60 In a context where most ICT 
infrastructures are owned, controlled or operated by multinational or foreign corporations, 
States must also pass appropriate national legislation regulating their human rights impact 
and imposing relevant corporate due diligence standards. Such measures should address: 
online disinformation, whether through content moderation or counter-speech; internet 
security and availability; as well as software vulnerability  all of which depend on 
57 ILC, Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm (n. 30), 155-156, in particular commentary to 
Article 3, § 17 and commentary to Article 5. See also Koivurova (n. 31), § 21; Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 
'The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States,' (1992) Ger Y Intl L 
26 27; Kolb (n. 27), 117, 127. Koivurova, para 21; Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 26 27; Kolb, 117, 127. 
58 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, [2017] ICJ Reports 43, 26 February 2007§§ 430-431. 
59 HRC, General Comment 31, (n. 38), §§ 7, 13; HRC, General Comment 36,  (n. 43), §§ 4, 13, 22. 
60 , Appl. no. 41720/13,  25 June 2019, § 127; HRC, General Comment 
31, ibid, §§ 8, 18; HRC, General Comment 36, ibid, §§ 13, 19, 27-28. 
corporate action. Other legislative measures of particular relevance in a health crisis 
include the provision of response and preparedness plans for cyber emergencies, along 
with an effective system for monitoring compliance with the law by State officials and third 
parties, to the extent permitted by international law.61 
 
b) Monitoring  
 
This brings us to the second type of cyber due diligence measures that States should and 
often must  to the extent practicable  adopt at all times, including during health crises: 
effective monitoring or surveillance of cyberspace. To be sure, obligations of due diligence 
do not necessarily require States to do the impossible to anticipate all possible online 
harms by ostensibly policing the internet and seeking information about potential threats. 
But they do require States to use their existing technical and financial resources to halt or 
prevent malicious cyber operations which they know or should have known about, again, 
to the extent possible and permitted by other rules of international law  in particular, the 
human rights to privacy and freedom of expression.  
 
Notably, in light of recent cyber threats facing the healthcare sector, Australia urged all 
62 In the same spirit of vigilance, the UK Health Secretary put the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GHCQ) in charge of monitoring 
information relating to the security of any network and information system held by or on 
behalf of the NHS or a public health body during the period ending on 31st December 
63 Digital technologies may also be used to monitor spaces and individuals to contain 
the spread of Covid-19, consistently with international law. Examples include video 
surveillance, contact tracing technologies and crowdsourcing systems.64        
 
c) Confidence-building 
 
The implementation of methods to enhance cybersecurity and mutual trust among States, 
- 65 may also be necessary to counter and 
prevent harmful cyber operations against the healthcare sector and other critical 
infrastructure during the Covid-19 outbreak and other public emergencies. Such measures 
may be required to the extent that they can address existing security vulnerabilities, such 
as data breaches or software flaws, or increase resilience in the recovery from harmful 
cyber operations, such as the creation of 24/7 Cyber Emergency Teams.66  
 
These measures may also be required, moreover, to comply with the IHL rule stipulating 
61 HRC, General Comment 36, (n. 43) § 21. 
62 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/unacceptable-malicious-cyber-activity; 
Stilgherrian, (n. 11). 
63 UK, Coronavirus Directions 2020, (n. 7), Section 4. 
64 Josh Toussaint-
Covid- The Guardian, 8 May 2020; Nancy Fiesler, 
- Harvard Medical School: News & Research, 
https://hms.harvard.edu/news/crowdsourcing-covid-19.  
65 UN GGE Report (n. 17), §§ 16-18. 
66 Ibid, § 17(c). 
67 Precautionary measures are particularly 
important in cyberwarfare, given the co-dependency and interconnectivity between civilian 
infrastructures and lawful military objectives.68 Thus, they may play a key role in preventing 
cyberattacks directed against military targets from spilling over onto civilian systems, 
including hospitals and other critical infrastructure.69  
 
d) International cooperation and capacity-building 
 
As neither the internet nor the pandemic knows territorial boundaries, international 
cooperation and institutional dialogue are crucial to prevent further outbreaks, contain the 
spread of the disease and eventually eliminate it. As the 2015 GGE report rightly 
[i]nternational cooperation and assistance can play an essential role in 
70  
 
Thus, it not surprising that several governments have recently called upon other States to 
cooperate with each other as well as with international institutions, particularly the World 
Health Organisation, in the context of the pandemic. The Czech Republic, for example, 
he rising number of cyberattacks on medical facilities worldwide reinforce 
[sic] the need for coordinated global action to protect [the] public health care sector from 
71 nity 
should urgently address cyberattacks against hospitals and other essential medical 
services that threaten already strained healthcare entities 72 Likewise, facing questions 
ly with [its] 
allies to hold the perpetrators to account and deter further malicious cyber activity around 
73  
 
Such calls for increased cooperation are not merely hortatory but may be required under 
existing international law. In particular, the Corfu Channel and no-harm principles may 
require States to alert or notify third States about the risk of malicious cyber operations 
emanating from or transiting through their territory. During armed conflict, States must 
cooperate with other States and with the UN to ensure respect for IHL.74 
 
Importantly, State cooperation may also be necessary to build the technical and financial 
capacity of less developed States to prevent, stop and redress online harms. In an 
interconnected world, security vulnerabilities in one State may compromise the integrity of 
systems beyond national borders.   
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V. Conclusion 
 
As essential services are now more than ever connected to the internet and other digital 
networks, measures of cyber due diligence are necessary to contain the spread of Covid-
19, prevent further outbreaks and ensure a full recovery from the current crisis. Such 
measures are not only required as a matter of policy and good governance, but also by 
existing international law. Whether or not a 
and policy framework to tackle online harms in times of Covid-19 and other health crises, 
even if it is spread across different international legal regimes. This framework  a true 
patchwork of different obligations  includes at the very least the Corfu Channel and no-
harm principles, and positive State obligations under specific bodies of law such as IHRL 
and IHL. Their interpretation and implementation are guided and complemented by the 
norms of responsible State behaviour and other voluntary commitments made by States. 
Accordingly, States cannot reasonably invoke the absence of a specific binding 
international rule governing of cyber harms as an excuse for inaction in the fight against 
Covid-19 and other health crises.  
  
